For our last meeting — : ( — we'll take a sort of potpourri approach. First, I'd like to talk a bit more about climate change ethics and policy. In particular, it seemed to me that there was much more to be said about issues of responsibility at both the individual and national levels. In the latter case, we bump up yet again to global justice issues. We'll spend around 40 minutes, say, on this.
Then Graham will give his presentation (shorter than other groups, as he's been left without a group) and we'll take some time to talk about biodiversity and the ethical issues devolving therefrom — another hour, perhaps. Graham would request that you read the following short selection from E. O. Wilson's book The Diversity of Life. Since we were late getting this to you, I do not regard it as "assigned", but it's an easy read and potentially good fodder for discussion.
Finally, we can use any remaining time to talk about any issues/questions that have been nagging you. Let's stop briefly to look back and survey the ground we've covered.
Showing posts with label Assignments. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Assignments. Show all posts
Monday, May 4
Tuesday, March 31
Meeting 11 (4/14) — Public and Private Science
Recall that our next meeting will be in two weeks: I hope you'll use the extra time out of class to conduct research on your final essays, prepare for your presentation, polish up your first essays, and so on.
When we meet again, Group 1 (Alex, Brittany, Dave, and Jennifer) will kick off the action. They've assigned chapter 3 of Kristin Shrader-Frechette's book, Taking Action, Saving Lives: Our Duties to Protect Environmental and Public Health (Oxford University Press, 2007). Please read this prior to the meeting.
Note that Professor Shrader-Frechette is the keynote speaker at the Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference this year (she'll be speaking on May 2nd in the Law School Courtroom, if I'm not mistaken), but you should keep an eye on the INPC website for the details.
Note that Professor Shrader-Frechette is the keynote speaker at the Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference this year (she'll be speaking on May 2nd in the Law School Courtroom, if I'm not mistaken), but you should keep an eye on the INPC website for the details.
Tuesday, March 24
Meeting 10 (3/31) — Science in a non-ideal World
Reading:
- Kitcher, Science, Truth, and Democracy, Chapters 10-11, 14. (We may read 12-13 later down the road --- I think they can be acceptably read out of order.)
- Please also re-read/skim and bring the Kitcher and Flory article (which should by now be illuminated by the background of Kitcher's perspective on well-ordered science).
Next time, we'll start with group 1's brief introduction to some of the problems Kitcher's ideal of Well-Ordered Science (WOS) allows us to see in our present social arrangements. I'm curious about whether his ideal gives us enough to be able to say what to do about these problems. We also didn't get a chance to talk in much detail about whether we agree that WOS represents an ideal. Can you imagine other directions in which our science policy should aim? I also wanted to talk a bit more about the problem of what to do if we should find certain areas of research to be wrong to pursue. Can we just ban their pursuit (105)?
Chapter 11 gets back to the question of the role the ideal of WOS should play in our thinking about science policy. Not only can it help us identify problems, it might serve a role in directing positive measures to improve things. For any discussion of social policy, don't we need to have a conception of the good at which we are aiming? This chapter also addresses some of the concerns we identified today surrounding the inclusion in the idea of "experts" in the construction of our scientific priorities. To what extent can we expect such experts to represent our interests? Should "elitism" dominate in the construction of our scientific priorities? Might not this be the best way of approximating a state of WOS?
The general question of how to put an ideal into motion in an imperfect world is addressed in Chapter 14, which begins to address some very specific problems that we can consider. Kitcher was on the NIH ethical working group when a lot of key questions were being considered there (or, depending on your perspective, not being considered there). So there are problems. No big surprise. But what should individual researchers do about them? So we might have a collective responsibility to redirect our collective scientific attention toward or away from certain projects, but how should that affect you as a working scientist (if indeed you hope to become one)?
Chapter 11 gets back to the question of the role the ideal of WOS should play in our thinking about science policy. Not only can it help us identify problems, it might serve a role in directing positive measures to improve things. For any discussion of social policy, don't we need to have a conception of the good at which we are aiming? This chapter also addresses some of the concerns we identified today surrounding the inclusion in the idea of "experts" in the construction of our scientific priorities. To what extent can we expect such experts to represent our interests? Should "elitism" dominate in the construction of our scientific priorities? Might not this be the best way of approximating a state of WOS?
The general question of how to put an ideal into motion in an imperfect world is addressed in Chapter 14, which begins to address some very specific problems that we can consider. Kitcher was on the NIH ethical working group when a lot of key questions were being considered there (or, depending on your perspective, not being considered there). So there are problems. No big surprise. But what should individual researchers do about them? So we might have a collective responsibility to redirect our collective scientific attention toward or away from certain projects, but how should that affect you as a working scientist (if indeed you hope to become one)?
Wednesday, March 18
Meeting 9 (3/24) — Well-Ordered Science
Reading:
Kitcher, Science, Truth, and Democracy, Chapters 7–10.
For next time, we'll begin to consider Kitcher's articulation of an ideal of how science should be pursued in a democratic society. To focus our discussion, I want us to think in particular about four questions (roughly corresponding to the four chapters of STD I've assigned). Let's do another small group discussion-followed by general discussion. And since we already have groups in place, we might as well put those into play (so that you have some forward notice about what to focus on in your reading).
1) Kitcher claims that "pure science" is a myth. What are his arguments and do you find them convincing? [Group 4]
2) What is the argument against pursuing lines of research (contra claims about the value of free inquiry)? [Group 3]
3) What is the ideal of well-ordered science and what can/should its role be in helping us think about how we pursue different scientific projects? [Group 2]
4) Kitcher believes that the ideal of well-ordered science can help us identify some problems in the current functioning of science. Which of these problems looks like the most worrisome? Which are most tractable? [Group 1]
Hope you're all having a good spring break. . . .
1) Kitcher claims that "pure science" is a myth. What are his arguments and do you find them convincing? [Group 4]
2) What is the argument against pursuing lines of research (contra claims about the value of free inquiry)? [Group 3]
3) What is the ideal of well-ordered science and what can/should its role be in helping us think about how we pursue different scientific projects? [Group 2]
4) Kitcher believes that the ideal of well-ordered science can help us identify some problems in the current functioning of science. Which of these problems looks like the most worrisome? Which are most tractable? [Group 1]
Hope you're all having a good spring break. . . .
Tuesday, March 3
Meeting 8 (3/10) — Science and Objectivity
For next time, please read Part I of Kitcher's Science, Truth, and Democracy. There are a number of themes that I'll want to focus on. First, there is the realism debate that we barely edged onto today in class: what reason have we to think that our best theories are merely empirically adequate if they concern things that are beyond the reach of direct observation? Kitcher discusses various responses (both homely and sophisticated) that we should attend to.
But the real interest is with his positive, pluralistic proposal in chapters 4-6. Science is the search not for any old truth (nor some obscure notion of 'Truth' with a capital 'T'): rather, it seeks significant truths. But significance is a matter of our aims and interests, about which there may be dispute. Do you find Kitcher's pluralism compelling here? What about his stance on significance?
But the real interest is with his positive, pluralistic proposal in chapters 4-6. Science is the search not for any old truth (nor some obscure notion of 'Truth' with a capital 'T'): rather, it seeks significant truths. But significance is a matter of our aims and interests, about which there may be dispute. Do you find Kitcher's pluralism compelling here? What about his stance on significance?
Tuesday, February 24
Meeting 7 (3/3) — What Role do Values Play in Science?
Last time we asked whether science (particularly biology) could tell us anything about value — where it comes from, what its nature is, whether it is in some sense objective — and concluded (I think) that there are lots of problems with a fully naturalistic approach to ethics and value generally. But perhaps it's worth thinking a bit more about whether some naturalistic approach to ethics could shed some light on the nature of value or on our acceptance of certain particular values. Kitcher, for instance, has not been just negative in his contributions. See his 1993 and 1998 papers on the evolution of altruism (for an overview of work on this topic, I recommend the SEP entry) and a more historically-philosophically oriented 2005 lecture on naturalistic ethics in general: "The Hall of Mirrors".
Next time, we shall begin to consider the particular role that values play in science. A bit more background is in order. As I indicated at the end of our last class, the scientist-turned-historian/philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn was deeply influential in this regard. He noted on the first page of his epochal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, that "History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed": and indeed it did. Rather that viewing science as a pristinely rational and disinterested pursuit (after something like the, perhaps charicatured, manner of Francis Bacon or Galileo), Kuhn offered a picture of "Normal Science" in which investigators simply took for granted much of the framework within which their investigations were carried out. Not everything was up for test. Good thing too, for if it were, chaos would probably result (you see this kind of chaos in the very early stages of scientific investigations where investigators are divided on the basic foundations of their field). Scientific revolutions are sudden changes in these "paradigms" of doing science which are not fully rational affairs. There's much more to say about this — at least a book's worth, it turns out —, but the crucial point for our purposes is that Kuhn turned the light of critical analysis on previously ignored social and value-laden aspects of scientific theorizing. Kuhn's investigations into the structure of scientific revolutions thus paralleled more general work conducted by some sociologists of science, in particular Merton (discussed in the Godfrey-Smith reading), who inquired into the norms of science and its reward structure in particular.
Much of this work is very interesting and enlightening. It's of course plainly true that science is conducted by people and people have all manner of normative, social, and political commitments. It's then natural to ask what influence these commitments might have on not just the general structure of scientific progress, but on the products of science. Here, the "Strong Program" in the sociology of science suggests that the image of science as a privileged form of inquiry is misguided. Science is instead "just another way of knowing" and perhaps relative to cultural values and norms. This salvo initiated what has been referred to as "The Science Wars", rumblings of which still echo. We won't be reading any sexy post-modern relativism, however (hilarious reading though it often is). Here's what's on tap for 3/3:
Next time, we shall begin to consider the particular role that values play in science. A bit more background is in order. As I indicated at the end of our last class, the scientist-turned-historian/philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn was deeply influential in this regard. He noted on the first page of his epochal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, that "History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed": and indeed it did. Rather that viewing science as a pristinely rational and disinterested pursuit (after something like the, perhaps charicatured, manner of Francis Bacon or Galileo), Kuhn offered a picture of "Normal Science" in which investigators simply took for granted much of the framework within which their investigations were carried out. Not everything was up for test. Good thing too, for if it were, chaos would probably result (you see this kind of chaos in the very early stages of scientific investigations where investigators are divided on the basic foundations of their field). Scientific revolutions are sudden changes in these "paradigms" of doing science which are not fully rational affairs. There's much more to say about this — at least a book's worth, it turns out —, but the crucial point for our purposes is that Kuhn turned the light of critical analysis on previously ignored social and value-laden aspects of scientific theorizing. Kuhn's investigations into the structure of scientific revolutions thus paralleled more general work conducted by some sociologists of science, in particular Merton (discussed in the Godfrey-Smith reading), who inquired into the norms of science and its reward structure in particular.
Much of this work is very interesting and enlightening. It's of course plainly true that science is conducted by people and people have all manner of normative, social, and political commitments. It's then natural to ask what influence these commitments might have on not just the general structure of scientific progress, but on the products of science. Here, the "Strong Program" in the sociology of science suggests that the image of science as a privileged form of inquiry is misguided. Science is instead "just another way of knowing" and perhaps relative to cultural values and norms. This salvo initiated what has been referred to as "The Science Wars", rumblings of which still echo. We won't be reading any sexy post-modern relativism, however (hilarious reading though it often is). Here's what's on tap for 3/3:
- Peter Godfrey-Smith, "The Challenge from Sociology of Science" (Chapter 8 of his Theory and Reality)
- Thomas Kuhn, "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice" (Chapter 13 of his The Essential Tension)
- Helen Longino, "Values and Objectivity" (Chapter 2 of her Science as Social Knowledge)
Tuesday, February 17
Meeting 6 (2/24) — from Science to Values?
We will switch gears for a little while to talk about the relation between science and values quite generally. First up for our next meeting, we'll look into a recent attempt to have science tell us something about where values come from in the first place. So for 2/24, please read:
Later, around the time Darwin published the Origin, shrewd thinkers in England like Malthus and Spencer were thinking hard about social problems like crime and poverty. Malthus, you might recall, was instrumental in Darwin’s thinking when he pointed out that a struggle for existence was inevitable so long as (unchecked) populations grew at a geometrical rate and resources linearly. This suggested to the so-called Social Darwinists that such social measures as the poor laws in England were doomed to fail. Criminals, the insane, the handicapped, the poor, and others were lumped into the “unfit” and Darwinian evolution supposedly tells us not to intervene in their removal from society. It is simply natural that they would be culled. They should be culled.
This line of thought, however, commits a number of mistakes. For one, it presumes that social undesirables form a homogenous class of evolutionarily unfit. For two, and more germane for our purposes, Social Darwinism commits what G.E. Moore called the naturalistic fallacy: the mistake of inferring what ought to be the case from what is the case. Just because something is “natural” (and this epithet would seem to need quite a bit of explanation), does not mean that it ought to be the case. So as we turn to the efforts of Ruse and Wilson to “biologicize” ethics, we should perhaps wonder whether they glide too easily from purported biological facts to moral principles. (Wilson, you might know, is the founding figure of the now mostly defunct movement of "Sociobiology"; he is still a prominent public biologist.)
What exactly is their project? This is essentially Kitcher’s question in his response. He identifies four different possible projects that Ruse and Wilson could be engaged in, concluding that none of them succeed in quite the way intended. This leaves open the question, though, of whether there isn’t some other way of "biologicizing" ethics. Is this a project worth doing? Does it have any hope of success? What might answers to these questions tell us about the relation between science and ethics?
- Ruse and Wilson, "Moral Philosophy as Applied Science"
- Kitcher, "Four Ways of 'Biologicizing' Ethics"
Later, around the time Darwin published the Origin, shrewd thinkers in England like Malthus and Spencer were thinking hard about social problems like crime and poverty. Malthus, you might recall, was instrumental in Darwin’s thinking when he pointed out that a struggle for existence was inevitable so long as (unchecked) populations grew at a geometrical rate and resources linearly. This suggested to the so-called Social Darwinists that such social measures as the poor laws in England were doomed to fail. Criminals, the insane, the handicapped, the poor, and others were lumped into the “unfit” and Darwinian evolution supposedly tells us not to intervene in their removal from society. It is simply natural that they would be culled. They should be culled.
This line of thought, however, commits a number of mistakes. For one, it presumes that social undesirables form a homogenous class of evolutionarily unfit. For two, and more germane for our purposes, Social Darwinism commits what G.E. Moore called the naturalistic fallacy: the mistake of inferring what ought to be the case from what is the case. Just because something is “natural” (and this epithet would seem to need quite a bit of explanation), does not mean that it ought to be the case. So as we turn to the efforts of Ruse and Wilson to “biologicize” ethics, we should perhaps wonder whether they glide too easily from purported biological facts to moral principles. (Wilson, you might know, is the founding figure of the now mostly defunct movement of "Sociobiology"; he is still a prominent public biologist.)
What exactly is their project? This is essentially Kitcher’s question in his response. He identifies four different possible projects that Ruse and Wilson could be engaged in, concluding that none of them succeed in quite the way intended. This leaves open the question, though, of whether there isn’t some other way of "biologicizing" ethics. Is this a project worth doing? Does it have any hope of success? What might answers to these questions tell us about the relation between science and ethics?
Tuesday, February 10
Look Ahead
For your reference, here's what we're up to for the rest of the class (and when): We'll finish up the first third of the course next week:
Meeting 5: Health and Global Justice (2/17)
In meetings 6-8, we'll switch gears a bit to consider the relationship between science and values quite generally. This will involve doing a bit of philosophy of science. Meeting 6 (2/24) will address attempts to understand values scientifically via "sociobiology". Meeting 7 (3/3) will examine recent challenges that science cannot properly be thought of as providing us with "objective" truths due to its thorough contamination with values. In Meeting 8 (3/10), we'll read Part I of Kitcher's book which attempts to find a middle ground conception of science which places values and norms in their proper place.
The next two meetings (3/24 and 3/31) (during which we'll finish Science, Truth, and Democracy) will pick up the themes that we broach in Meeting 5: how should we, as a democratic society, go about ordering our scientific priorities. I'd like to have all of your first papers turned in by the Monday (4/6) after that Meeting 10. (I'll write more about those papers in a separate post shortly — running out of steam here). Then we'll have a week off (well, you'll have a week off: I'll be at a conference) — no class on Tuesday 4/7. [Whew!]
Our last four meetings (the 17th, 21st, 27th of April and May 5th) will be up to you. Mostly: As the 12th Annual Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference will take place from May 1st-3rd at UI and WSU on the topic "The Environment" and several of the papers (including the Keynote) will concern ethical and evidential issues surrounding global climate change, I'd very much like to see one group tackle that issue on the 28th so it's all in our heads before the conference (which you'll be encouraged to attend, btw). I'll send out a post in a few days with more details about how I'd like this to work, but you should be thinking now about different topics you'd like to work on in the context of a final paper/group project. Thumb through the rest of the Rollin book as for some suggestions. Or if any interesting ideas have occurred to you that you don't think are on others' radar, feel free to post them in the comments section here.
Meeting 5: Health and Global Justice (2/17)
In meetings 6-8, we'll switch gears a bit to consider the relationship between science and values quite generally. This will involve doing a bit of philosophy of science. Meeting 6 (2/24) will address attempts to understand values scientifically via "sociobiology". Meeting 7 (3/3) will examine recent challenges that science cannot properly be thought of as providing us with "objective" truths due to its thorough contamination with values. In Meeting 8 (3/10), we'll read Part I of Kitcher's book which attempts to find a middle ground conception of science which places values and norms in their proper place.
The next two meetings (3/24 and 3/31) (during which we'll finish Science, Truth, and Democracy) will pick up the themes that we broach in Meeting 5: how should we, as a democratic society, go about ordering our scientific priorities. I'd like to have all of your first papers turned in by the Monday (4/6) after that Meeting 10. (I'll write more about those papers in a separate post shortly — running out of steam here). Then we'll have a week off (well, you'll have a week off: I'll be at a conference) — no class on Tuesday 4/7. [Whew!]
Our last four meetings (the 17th, 21st, 27th of April and May 5th) will be up to you. Mostly: As the 12th Annual Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference will take place from May 1st-3rd at UI and WSU on the topic "The Environment" and several of the papers (including the Keynote) will concern ethical and evidential issues surrounding global climate change, I'd very much like to see one group tackle that issue on the 28th so it's all in our heads before the conference (which you'll be encouraged to attend, btw). I'll send out a post in a few days with more details about how I'd like this to work, but you should be thinking now about different topics you'd like to work on in the context of a final paper/group project. Thumb through the rest of the Rollin book as for some suggestions. Or if any interesting ideas have occurred to you that you don't think are on others' radar, feel free to post them in the comments section here.
Meeting 5 (2/17) — Justice and Health
Thanks to Dave McIlroy for an interesting take on the many perils of peer-review. Let's keep the conversation going here (and possibly for the first part of our next class).
In many ways, I think the central problems in research ethics we've seen (and the non-obviousness of any compelling solutions to them) show up again in our next topic: research prioritization and health care justice. It seems that we can ask after the moral properties both of individual agents (researchers, doctors, politicians, citizens, consumers, &c.) and the social social institutions that they (we) collectively compose and utilize. It seems possible that our institutions through no particular dereliction of individual obligations can harm others (or encourage or allow individual harms). In the case of our academic institutions, these harms may be minor (still, we should take care to distinguish, even if vaguely, between regrettable features of a social institution — say, its discouraging people from being friendly — and harms that fall more clearly into the moral realm). But it is far from clear what any solution might look like. Is it more ethics training (as Dave and Dave suggest), greater transparency, more anonymity, standing juries, &c.? Or it may be that this is "as good as it gets": though problematic in this or that way, the institution is, all things considered, optimal.
In a similar vein, we can ask whether the institutions of scientific research are optimally pursuing research projects that they ought to pursue. Take disease research: it features a so-called "90/10 gap": "90% of humanity's burden of disease receives only 10% of the world's health research resources" (Flory and Kitcher 2004, 40). What should we do about that?
So far, you'll notice, we've tackled problems in science ethics that seem (generally) aptly characterized as "negative". Under what conditions is it permissible to utilize animals (including humans) in research? What should you not do as a researcher? It seems to me that the most pressing moral issues in science (and correspondingly, the most difficult) are those which ask whether we have any (positive) duties to adjust our scientific institutions to world need. I can't help feel that we do, but I'm still stuck on what that change should look like.
I'm assigning three articles that I hope will help guide our thinking:
As you'll see, we're starting to bump up against some difficult theoretical issues in ethics and political philosophy. John Rawls is a key figure in discussions about justice. I'll have something to say about the key features of his theory of justice, but if you would like to get a very good overview, head over the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I take this meeting to be pivotal for our later discussion: Kitcher's book Science, Truth, and Democracy proposes a way to address questions about how we prioritize our scientific projects.
In many ways, I think the central problems in research ethics we've seen (and the non-obviousness of any compelling solutions to them) show up again in our next topic: research prioritization and health care justice. It seems that we can ask after the moral properties both of individual agents (researchers, doctors, politicians, citizens, consumers, &c.) and the social social institutions that they (we) collectively compose and utilize. It seems possible that our institutions through no particular dereliction of individual obligations can harm others (or encourage or allow individual harms). In the case of our academic institutions, these harms may be minor (still, we should take care to distinguish, even if vaguely, between regrettable features of a social institution — say, its discouraging people from being friendly — and harms that fall more clearly into the moral realm). But it is far from clear what any solution might look like. Is it more ethics training (as Dave and Dave suggest), greater transparency, more anonymity, standing juries, &c.? Or it may be that this is "as good as it gets": though problematic in this or that way, the institution is, all things considered, optimal.
In a similar vein, we can ask whether the institutions of scientific research are optimally pursuing research projects that they ought to pursue. Take disease research: it features a so-called "90/10 gap": "90% of humanity's burden of disease receives only 10% of the world's health research resources" (Flory and Kitcher 2004, 40). What should we do about that?
So far, you'll notice, we've tackled problems in science ethics that seem (generally) aptly characterized as "negative". Under what conditions is it permissible to utilize animals (including humans) in research? What should you not do as a researcher? It seems to me that the most pressing moral issues in science (and correspondingly, the most difficult) are those which ask whether we have any (positive) duties to adjust our scientific institutions to world need. I can't help feel that we do, but I'm still stuck on what that change should look like.
I'm assigning three articles that I hope will help guide our thinking:
- Benatar, "Justice and Medical Research"
- Pogge, "Responsibilities for Poverty-Related Ill Health"
- Flory and Kitcher, "Global Health and the Scientific Research Agenda"
As you'll see, we're starting to bump up against some difficult theoretical issues in ethics and political philosophy. John Rawls is a key figure in discussions about justice. I'll have something to say about the key features of his theory of justice, but if you would like to get a very good overview, head over the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I take this meeting to be pivotal for our later discussion: Kitcher's book Science, Truth, and Democracy proposes a way to address questions about how we prioritize our scientific projects.
Friday, February 6
Clarification about Case Study Discussion
Some of you realized that the paper assignment I handed out in class last time gave a noon Friday deadline for posting your group's case study response on this blog. Since I neglected to mention that here (and there were only a few copies of the paper assignment), you can neglect that deadline. But I would like to see some specific posts/discussion about those cases particularly focusing on the reasons you have for accepting or not accepting the sample research proposals.
Tuesday, February 3
Meeting 4 (2/10)
We will turn to issues in research ethics, professional misconduct, fraud, and other more insidious vices such as unbridled optimism. In this connection, I think it's worth thinking about the whole Cold Fusion affair from twenty years ago (Grazer's article documents it). But our primary text will be another Chapter from Webster's book.
If you're looking for other interesting instances of fraud, the second chapter of Junk Science (mostly available on Google Books), documents a number of interesting cases.
If you're looking for other interesting instances of fraud, the second chapter of Junk Science (mostly available on Google Books), documents a number of interesting cases.
Further Discussion on the Case Studies
Those of you who were in class today may continue the discussion of your group in Blackboard (your group should have a discussion area to itself). If you log in and don't see one in the discussion area (and were in one), let me know and I'll fix it. What I'd like is for you to work with your group to produce a short formal response to your research proposal, defending your particular stance, and indicating what questions would need to be addressed before the research was sanctioned. If you find that you're changing your mind from earlier, you might note and discuss that as well. Choose someone from your group to post your final verdicts here. At that point, I hope discussion will open up about the bigger theoretical and methodological issues. Remember, I made these up (including many of the background details), so don't go attacking the proposals on factual grounds. This is an experiment.
Here are the "Research Proposals":
Experimental Proposal J
Background
Malaria is a disease, spread primarily by the Anopheles class of mosquito, that presently kills millions of people around the world, many in poorer parts of the world where access to chemical prophylaxis (e.g., quinine, mefloquine) and physical prevention (e.g., screens) are much less available. The proposed research project involves assessing the effectiveness of a novel, inexpensive topical ointment in preventing the spread of human malaria by specifically deterring bites from the Anopheles mosquitoes, though at the cost of increasing bites by other mosquitoes that do not appear to carry any disease.
Methodology
Rather than test this ointment on human subjects, our research group proposes to treat a number of dogs with this ointment, expose them over the course of several weeks to mosquitoes, some of which are malaria carriers, and monitor the spread of the disease. Our hypothesis is that dogs treated with the ointment will show significantly less incidence of malaria than the control group. If this is successful, we will recommend immediate human trials and (pending successful governmental review) subsequent global distribution.
Experimental Subjects
While dogs are vulnerable to malaria, their symptoms are usually much less severe than humans — and rarely fatal. Unfortunately, usual palliative measures (quinine) are less effective. It is probable that only a few dogs will need to be euthanized at the conclusion of the experiment.
Due to the nature of the ointment, the animals will have to be shaved every day or so. While this is often uncomfortable and frightening, it does not harm them. The bites from the other mosquitoes they are likely to get (if the ointment is successful) will have to be administered to after the experiment is over, as the use of any itch-reducing ointment will likely interfere with the effectiveness of the experimental ointment.
Experimental Proposal K
Background
Malaria is a disease, spread primarily by the Anopheles class of mosquito, that presently kills millions of people around the world, many in poorer parts of the world where access to chemical prophylaxis (e.g., quinine, mefloquine) and physical prevention (e.g., screens) are much less available. The proposed research project involves assessing the effectiveness of a novel, inexpensive topical ointment in preventing the spread of human malaria by specifically deterring bites from the Anopheles mosquitoes, though at the cost of increasing bites by other mosquitoes that do not appear to carry any disease. Animal models have already shown that this treatment is approximately 98% effective in preventing infection.
Methodology
Human volunteers in areas high malarial incidence will be treated with the ointment and monitored over several months to determine whether this incidence declines. In order to speed the experiment, our group will select sites which, due to poverty, typically lack physical measures of preventing mosquito bites (such as window or bed screens). Nor can we offer any topical analgesics to help control itching due to increased bites from non-carrier mosquitoes, as these ointments have been shown to interfere with the effectiveness of the experimental ointment. If the success of the animal model is reproduced, we will seek governmental approval for immediate global distribution.
Experimental Subjects
Because of their location, the volunteers for this experiment do not face any greater risk of contracting malaria than non-volunteers. The known side-effects of uncomfortable itching due to increased mosquito bites, while uncomfortable and distracting are not unmanageable. Volunteers will be fully informed of the slight risk (<0.1%>Experimental Proposal L
Background
The so-called “placebo effect” (in which a biological inert agent produces a physiological effect because of the psychological expectation that the agent is a treatment) is well known. The biology behind this phenomenon, however, is not well understood. In particular, the effects of hormones on the neurochemistry underlying this effect are suspected to play a role. This study will help uncover this role.
Methodology & Experimental Subjects
The consistent and well-understood elevation of certain hormones in pregnant women provides an excellent test group to study the mechanisms of the placebo effects. By the very nature of this effect, it is not possible to fully inform volunteers of the true purpose of the study. Instead, volunteers will be gathered by offering an experimental treatment for morning sickness (which in some women is extreme). These women will be told that they will be “screened” for use of the new drug, when in fact some of the women will be selected as controls. These women will be told that because of a certain genetic marker, they are ineligible for the drug, but should return on a weekly basis for “rescreening” in case their status changes. Other women will be told that they are compatible for the treatment and will be given an allotment of sugar pills. They will also be asked to return weekly for monitoring.
Previous studies have shown that the placebo effect is greatest when subjects believe that there is some risk attached to the treatment. Thus, we will inform the women that there is a minimal risk (<0.1%)>
Here are the "Research Proposals":
Experimental Proposal J
Background
Malaria is a disease, spread primarily by the Anopheles class of mosquito, that presently kills millions of people around the world, many in poorer parts of the world where access to chemical prophylaxis (e.g., quinine, mefloquine) and physical prevention (e.g., screens) are much less available. The proposed research project involves assessing the effectiveness of a novel, inexpensive topical ointment in preventing the spread of human malaria by specifically deterring bites from the Anopheles mosquitoes, though at the cost of increasing bites by other mosquitoes that do not appear to carry any disease.
Methodology
Rather than test this ointment on human subjects, our research group proposes to treat a number of dogs with this ointment, expose them over the course of several weeks to mosquitoes, some of which are malaria carriers, and monitor the spread of the disease. Our hypothesis is that dogs treated with the ointment will show significantly less incidence of malaria than the control group. If this is successful, we will recommend immediate human trials and (pending successful governmental review) subsequent global distribution.
Experimental Subjects
While dogs are vulnerable to malaria, their symptoms are usually much less severe than humans — and rarely fatal. Unfortunately, usual palliative measures (quinine) are less effective. It is probable that only a few dogs will need to be euthanized at the conclusion of the experiment.
Due to the nature of the ointment, the animals will have to be shaved every day or so. While this is often uncomfortable and frightening, it does not harm them. The bites from the other mosquitoes they are likely to get (if the ointment is successful) will have to be administered to after the experiment is over, as the use of any itch-reducing ointment will likely interfere with the effectiveness of the experimental ointment.
Experimental Proposal K
Background
Malaria is a disease, spread primarily by the Anopheles class of mosquito, that presently kills millions of people around the world, many in poorer parts of the world where access to chemical prophylaxis (e.g., quinine, mefloquine) and physical prevention (e.g., screens) are much less available. The proposed research project involves assessing the effectiveness of a novel, inexpensive topical ointment in preventing the spread of human malaria by specifically deterring bites from the Anopheles mosquitoes, though at the cost of increasing bites by other mosquitoes that do not appear to carry any disease. Animal models have already shown that this treatment is approximately 98% effective in preventing infection.
Methodology
Human volunteers in areas high malarial incidence will be treated with the ointment and monitored over several months to determine whether this incidence declines. In order to speed the experiment, our group will select sites which, due to poverty, typically lack physical measures of preventing mosquito bites (such as window or bed screens). Nor can we offer any topical analgesics to help control itching due to increased bites from non-carrier mosquitoes, as these ointments have been shown to interfere with the effectiveness of the experimental ointment. If the success of the animal model is reproduced, we will seek governmental approval for immediate global distribution.
Experimental Subjects
Because of their location, the volunteers for this experiment do not face any greater risk of contracting malaria than non-volunteers. The known side-effects of uncomfortable itching due to increased mosquito bites, while uncomfortable and distracting are not unmanageable. Volunteers will be fully informed of the slight risk (<0.1%>Experimental Proposal L
Background
The so-called “placebo effect” (in which a biological inert agent produces a physiological effect because of the psychological expectation that the agent is a treatment) is well known. The biology behind this phenomenon, however, is not well understood. In particular, the effects of hormones on the neurochemistry underlying this effect are suspected to play a role. This study will help uncover this role.
Methodology & Experimental Subjects
The consistent and well-understood elevation of certain hormones in pregnant women provides an excellent test group to study the mechanisms of the placebo effects. By the very nature of this effect, it is not possible to fully inform volunteers of the true purpose of the study. Instead, volunteers will be gathered by offering an experimental treatment for morning sickness (which in some women is extreme). These women will be told that they will be “screened” for use of the new drug, when in fact some of the women will be selected as controls. These women will be told that because of a certain genetic marker, they are ineligible for the drug, but should return on a weekly basis for “rescreening” in case their status changes. Other women will be told that they are compatible for the treatment and will be given an allotment of sugar pills. They will also be asked to return weekly for monitoring.
Previous studies have shown that the placebo effect is greatest when subjects believe that there is some risk attached to the treatment. Thus, we will inform the women that there is a minimal risk (<0.1%)>
Tuesday, January 27
Topics/Reading for 2/4
As I mentioned in class, I want to continue talking about Chapter 4 of Rollin next week alongside our discussion of the use of animals in scientific research: Chapter 5 of Rollin and this PDF from Webster's book (NB: this link will only work from within blackboard — don't email me to tell me that the link is broken; it's also in the Supplemental Readings folder in blackboard).
One other note about this blog. It was pretty quiet last week. That's understandable, of course, since our first full meeting was just today. I encourage you to start posting your reactions, questions, other material you think the rest of us should read/see, whatever. Don't worry about being off base in these first few posts: we'll find a groove sooner or later.
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