Clarifying Human Dignity (Response to Graham…)

You brought up some excellent points in regards to the two types of human dignity in your last post Graham. I think that this is a very important distinction to make. I admit that as I’ve been thinking through the human enhancement, it has been the first definition that I’ve utilized (as you picked up on my last post). Just to clarify the first definition of human dignity relates to our intrinsic value as human individuals and then the second definition of human dignity (as Graham pointed out) relates to our behavior as human individuals. We use this second definition when we say that someone’s actions (running around naked or throwing feces at people) don’t measure up to some kind of social standard.

I think we can agree that the second definition of human dignity in regards to behavior isn’t what gives us intrinsic value. Going back to your lunatic running the streets naked. The fact that he acts in a socially deviant way doesn’t negate the fact that he has intrinsic value. This is why you as an individual can’t just shoot him or enslave him for his behavior. Although his actions may be undignified as a human being, there is still something about him which must be respected. He may need to be punished for his criminal behavior, but as Kant points out to punish someone for a crime IS to treat them as an end and not a means. It recognizes their individual responsibility as human.

You wonder why people like Kass seem to think that our human dignity can be so easily lost. I think a clarification here may be helpful. Kass’s whole point is that human dignity can’t be lost! It is impossible to extract from an individual there intrinsic worth as a person. It is actually those who think an individual’s worth comes from their biology or external social views that need to answer why human dignity can be taken away from someone.

What Kass is saying is that while, a person’s human dignity can never be taken from them, we can treat others as if they didn’t have that intrinsic worth. That is the danger of post humanism, not that is will somehow remove the “dignity gene” but that it isn’t treating the individual with the respect due them as a person with intrinsic human dignity. By analogy, enslaving a group of people doesn’t actually remove their dignity as persons but in a horrifying way treats them as if they weren’t intrinsically valuable individuals.

I can relate to your frustration when Kass never clearly defines human dignity. That is one of the weaknesses of his argument I admit. But, let’s look at both sides. The post-human proponents say that if Kass can’t give a clear definition for human dignity then he shouldn’t denounce them as harming this unidentified thing. On the same note though, if the proponents can’t give an adequate definition for human dignity how can they say that Kass’s policies oppose it? It’s pretty clear I believe that the proponents haven’t provided a clear and defensible definition for human dignity and how post humanism won’t harm it.

One last question, I haven’t taken phil bio but the notion of essentialism seems interesting. If essentialism holds that a species has a distinct set of properties that define it as a species, are these properties physical or immaterial? Is essentialism referring to scientifically, statistically determined characteristics like Fukuyama’s Factor X or does it refer to a philosophical, classical definition of essences? (You’ll have to excuse my ignorance).

Human Enhancement: Buy the Ticket, Take the Ride

This started as a response to Alex’s post from a few days ago, but I think it’s grown long enough to become its very own thread.

While I'm sympathetic to Alex's view that human enhancement (particularly genetic) holds many tempting opportunities for improvement of the human condition, I have serious reservations about it. For me, morality of the pursuit of knowledge always comes down to motive and intent. Personally, I'm not against human enhancement for what it is, another technology to augment our reality. I have two primary issues with it, one stemming from personal belief and one from my concern for social justice.

To be fair, I will disclose upfront that my personal belief stems partly from the Buddhist teachings of attachment, desire, and no-self as they relate to human suffering. From my personal perspective, I am skeptical of the motives people may have for wanting to "improve" themselves in the first place. Are we really doing it to improve our health and well-being, or is it because it would be "cool" to have the latest and greatest super-human capabilities? Does this desire arise out of a general dissatisfaction with our present state? I think this is, as Kristian eluded to, psychological more than anything else. A lot of proponents talk about "improving well-being" and this "moral obligation to future generations to enhance," but I really believe these arguments are trying to hide a deeper, self-centered motivations of wanting to change who or what we are now. I guess in this way I agree with Kass somewhat when he says we should ‘let healthy bodies be,’ but this doesn’t mean I’m completely opposed to people wanting to ‘augment’ themselves either. We’re all at different stages of acceptance of our present condition, so I think it’s natural to have these motives. I think that in any case (and Dave, I’m also a fan of casuistry, case-based reasoning), the individual needs to truly reflect on what it is she values about both her present state and the improvements that enhancement supposedly will bring.

From the social justice perspective, this is where I hit a wall with human enhancement technology. Again, I think that self-centeredness is part of the problem here, because it seems to me that enhancement is often pursued out of personal fantasy and greed. Aside from that, however, I think we do have a moral obligation to the worse-off, and I don’t see how enhancement research is going to help them in the near future. Thomas Pogge, Norman Daniels, Dan Brock, James Flory, and Philip Kitcher (all those papers we had for the discussion on justice in research) all argue that we have an obligation to devote scientific research and resources to other people and other nations worse off than ourselves, especially when we have a direct involvement in their economic or social affairs. These resources are limited, and the more we devote to enhancement tech, the less we devote to AIDS, malaria, TB, water/food crises, etc. I don’t buy the proponents’ argument for one second that enhancement tech will eventually help these people someday. If we have a problem now distributing resources appropriately, how can we expect this to change in the future? I know Bostrom argues that future people will be smarter and maybe even more caring than we are, but I’d rather not chance the survival of our modern population on the enlightenment of future generations.

I also wanted to add that I agree with Dave that human enhancement is already happening, and I think we’re wandering through fog along the edge of a cliff. The technological capabilities to select for certain traits in embryos are mostly a reality, and it’s already being performed to some extent when we select ‘healthy’ embryos for IVF or choose to abort others when found to carry some dangerous disease. Our society obviously has a fascination with mood- and physical-enhancement drugs, which are highly advertised and made widely available. Cosmetic plastic surgery, whether the proponents want to call it enhancement or not, is probably one of the worst yet most widespread fads of our modern times, in my opinion. Maybe there’s no stopping the train, but I hope that individuals think carefully before they jump on board because, in the words of Hunter S. Thompson, “buy the ticket, take the ride.”